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Pretty, Dead: Sociosexuality, Rationality and the Transition into Zom-Being 
Steve Jones 
 
Unlike other horror archetypes, zombies have an established presence in philosophical 
discussion. Following David Chalmers in particular,
i
 many philosophers have evoked the 
undead when hypothesizing about consciousness. In recent years, zombies have been 
utilized to examine phenomenology and mental knowledge (see Furst; Malatesti; 
Macpherson), visual processing and intentional action (see Mole; Wu), and the relationship 
between consciousness and cognition (Smithies). These are all variations on the explanatory 
gap problem, which refers to a rift between psycho-physiological explanations of mental 
function (deriving from neuroscience, for instance) and the intuitive sense that selfhood, 
agency, and introspective knowledge are metaphysically significant.  
Such discussion frequently feels nebulous. Neuroscience is fascinating, but its empirical 
findings can be difficult to relate to everyday, experiential reality. Indeed, neuroscience 
habitually seeks to uncover how the mind operates in spite of our intuitions. Abstract 
philosophical discussions about consciousness are just as intangible. Debates over 
philosophical zombies (hereafter, p-zombies) are commonly rooted in notions about 
hypothetical twin worlds, ruminations on the impossibility of imagining what it would be like 
to lack phenomenal experiences, and semantic discussions regarding whether conceivability 
equates to possibility. Again, it is often hard to comprehend how such discussion relates to 
personal experiences.  
Although p-zombies and movie zombies are regarded as entirely separate entities by key 
thinkers in the field (for reasons that will become apparent in due course), I propose that 
movie zombies illuminate these somewhat opaque philosophical debates by offering an 
accessible route into the issues. Fundamentally, both the p-zombie debates and zombie 
movies are underpinned by the same focal point: zombies are non-conscious humans. Yet 
the filmic version of that problem is grounded in an experiential world rather than 
conceptual theorization. Cinematic storytelling devices – narrative, characterization, 
dialogue and so forth – allow filmmakers to present ĐhaƌaĐteƌs’ experiences in an 
instinctively accessible manner. Protagonists interact in social worlds that are comparable to 
our own, and narrative drama is typically driven by social interaction. The ĐhaƌaĐteƌs’ 
interactions are thereby rendered concrete and familiar, regardless of their fictionality. 
Whereas conjectural debates regarding p-zombies begin with theoretical models of self 
(seeking to test their legitimacy), zombie movies are rooted in and prioritize an experiential 
vision of selfhood. 
This chapter focuses on a particular strand of the subgenre: transition narratives, in which 
human protagonists gradually turn into zombies. In transition narratives, protagonists are 
able to articulate their experiences as they undergo their transformation.
ii
 As such, they 
directly reflect on changes in their mental states, linking those shifts to the physical and 
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social realms they occupy. The specific case study examined in this chapter is Pretty Dead 
(2013). The film is partially constructed from footage shot by lead protagonist Regina, a 24 
year old MD, as she charts her metamorphosis into a zombie. After killing a pizza delivery 
driver and eventually turning on her fiancé Ryan, Regina is institutionalized. In tandem with 
RegiŶa’s autobiographical footage, Pretty Dead is comprised of videotaped interviews with a 
clinician (Dr. Romera)
iii
 ǁho is ĐoŶǀiŶĐed that RegiŶa is suffeƌiŶg fƌoŵ Cotaƌd’s sǇŶdƌoŵe: a 
delusion in which the patient believes they are dead. The narrative is ambiguous about the 
legitiŵaĐǇ of RegiŶa’s Đlaiŵs thƌoughout, iŶteƌĐuttiŶg ďetǁeeŶ heƌ oǁŶ asseƌtioŶs aŶd 
Roŵeƌa’s ƌatioŶalist explanations. The Đlash ďetǁeeŶ RegiŶa’s eǆpeƌieŶĐes as a transitional 
being and Roŵeƌa’ scientific diagnosis is centralized in Pretty Dead. That is, the narrative 
brings two views on the self – intuitive and empirical – into direct conflict. Pretty Dead 
thereby encourages the viewer to question the validity of both, and their compatibility.  
As is common among transition narratives, sociality is emphasized as a defining aspect of 
RegiŶa’s life iŶ Pretty Dead. TƌaŶsitioŶal pƌotagoŶists’ ŵetaŵoƌphoses aƌe ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶallǇ 
punctuated by turning points at which they attack living counterparts; usually their closest 
companions. For example, in Harold’s Going Stiff (2011) and Return of the Living Dead Part 3 
(1993), full-blown zombies are depicted as inarticulate beasts who violently attack the living. 
Knowing that the same fate awaits them, the transitional protagonists ͞liǀe͟ iŶ fear that 
they will eventually turn on their loved ones. Both Harold’s Going Stiff and Return of the 
Living Dead Part 3 are stories driven by romantic couplings, meaning that the transitional 
pƌotagoŶist’s loss of rational control – their inability to halt their transfiguration into 
zombiedom (or zom-being) and the ruination of their bonds with other humans – is 
accentuated. This theme is ubiquitous in transition narratives, which typically situate 
metamorphosing protagonists within intimate relationships with living partners. Other 
examples of this trend include Zombie Honeymoon (2004), Zombie Love (2008), Zombie Love 
Story (2008), and True Love Zombie (2012).
iv
  
Following this convention, when Regina films her transformation in Pretty Dead, she also 
captures a parallel change in her love life. In particular, the footage charts the detrimental 
effects her transformation has on her relationship with her fiancé Ryan. As suĐh, RegiŶa’s 
identity and rationality – what she is, how she behaves, even how she experiences the world 
– are inextricable from her sociality; affiliations and interactions with other beings that give 
her (human) life meaning. Eventually, Regina loses control. Her romantic attachment to 
Ryan is replaced by her desire for his flesh. Although both types of desire reach their fullest 
expression carnally – human love-making or zombie flesh-eating – the former signifies 
RegiŶa’s recognizably human soĐialitǇ, ǁhile the latteƌ deŶotes RegiŶa’s movement into 
zom-being.  
Fƌoŵ RegiŶa’s aŶthƌopocentric view, the latter is monstrous. She understands love, in 
contrast, as a sign of her humanity. In Pretty Dead, RegiŶa’s humanity is measured by the 
self-ĐoŶtƌol she eǆeƌts iŶ ƌesistiŶg heƌ uƌge to haƌŵ RǇaŶ. As suĐh, RegiŶa’s loǀe foƌ RǇaŶ is 
characterized as rational agency. Yet that conception of sexual love is counter-intuitive: that 
kind of passion does not emanate from conscious, rational choice in the first instance. That 
is not to say that sexual passion is synonymous with complete irrationality. On this point I 
concur with Nikolay Milkov, although Milkoǀ’s suďseƋueŶt asseƌtioŶ that ͞seǆual eǆpeƌieŶĐe 
proceeds in aĐts of ƌeasoŶiŶg͟ (159, emphasis added) does not adequately resolve the 
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problem either. Rather, it should be noted that phenomena such as love and sexual passion 
can be explained or reflected on via rationality, but the emotional experience of social 
kinship cannot be captured via such language. Experiencing and rationalizing are 
ontologically different. Sex thus illustrates that a) there is a troubling disjuncture between 
rationalist-theoretical conceptions of selfhood and selfhood as it is experienced in the real, 
social realm, and b) there is a natural bridge between personal, introspective self-
knowledge and external social selfhood. Throughout this chapter, I use the term 
͞soĐioseǆual͟ to deŶote ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh seǆualitǇ epitomizes the relationship between 
sociality and selfhood as it is experienced in the real, interdependent world. 
By emphasizing soĐioseǆualitǇ’s ƌole iŶ self-experience, Pretty Dead illuminates aspects of 
consciousness that are neglected in philosophical debates regarding p-zombies. 
Consciousness sets apart humans from zombies. Ergo, so too does sociosexuality. Insofar as 
sociosexuality is measurable via behavior, it can be pinned down in a way that 
consciousness and qualia cannot. The p-zombie argument is undercut by the notion that p-
zombies might have conscious experiences, but might not be able to articulate them. 
Similarly, an articulate zombie may lack qualia, but may lay verbal claims to consciousness 
that could not be proven false. Consciousness is invisible and intangible because it is 
introspective and metaphysical. This is not to suggest that all mental states are manifested 
in behavior.
v
 Rather, when Regina turns on Ryan, that behavior evinces a significant change 
in her consciousness. The action violates RegiŶa’s conscious will to maintain the sociosexual 
relationship she shares with Ryan, and manifests an ontological shift away from her identity 
as a human. Although she does not become a full-blown non-conscious zombie before the 
end credits roll, Regina overtly becomes less human and more akin to a zombie as the text 
pƌogƌesses. KilliŶg RǇaŶ is a keǇ iŶdiĐatoƌ that RegiŶa is ͞pƌettǇ dead,͟ ďut oŶlǇ iŶasmuch as 
Regina believes she is a rational being, able to know and control her behaviors via cognition 
and reflection. 
 
Conscious State[ment]s: A Primer in Zom-Being 
Contributors to the p-zombie debates principally seek to test the legitimacy of physicalism 
(see Lehrer; Garrett; Horowitz) and/or to understand whether qualia – the essential 
properties of experiences – can be explained by functionalist accounts of selfhood. These 
debates hinge on the idea that p-zombies are physically identical to living humans, but have 
no conscious experiences. Consequently, ͞there is nothing it is like to be a [p-]zombie͟ 
(Chalmers, 249). To put it in concrete terms, although p-zombies are physically identical to 
any conscious person, they do not have qualia.
vi
 So, a p-zombie can walk hand-in-hand on a 
beach with another p-zombie, look into theiƌ paƌtŶeƌ’s eyes and kiss as the sun sets, but 
during this interaction neither p-zombie will experience anything. The possibility of p-
zombies poses a threat to functionalism since it amounts to saying that it is conceivable (and 
therefore possible)
vii
 that consciousness is separable from our physical capacity for 
conscious experience. 
As Chalmers notes in his influential argument, p-zombies are not the same as the filmic 
undead (95). Rebecca Roman Hanrahan suĐĐiŶĐtlǇ suŵŵates the ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ: ͞it ǁould ďe 
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very difficult to make a movie about [p-]zombies, since they behave just as their qualia-
ridden human counterparts do.͟ Therefore, ͞[t]heƌe ǁould ďe Ŷo ǁaǇ foƌ the filŵŵakeƌs to 
depict any … difference between [p-zombies] aŶd oƌdiŶaƌǇ huŵaŶs͟ (303). However, the p-
zombie argument’s pƌeŵise – that zombies are identical to living humans but lack 
phenomenal experience – has become ever more pertinent to zombie fiction over the last 
thirty years. The lumbering, somnambulistic movie zombies Hanrahan has in mind are 
relatively uncommon in contemporary zombie narratives. Contemporary movie zombies are 
beings whose vital organs have ceased to function, and so they externally appear to be 
different to living humans. To answer Hanrahan, this is how filmmakers distinguish between 
living and undead individuals. Zombies also engage in behaviors such as flesh-eating, which 
are frowned upon by their living counterparts. In many contemporary zombie movies, 
zombies are akin to pale, cannibalistic humans who suffer from a severe skin condition. That 
is, their conventional behaviors and appearance do not necessarily evince a lack of cerebral 
acuity or any essential quality of their mental processes.  
Transition narratives such as Pretty Dead flag this kinship between living and undead by 
focusing on protagonists who transform from the former into the latter, thereby linking 
those states. Transitional protagonists have consciousness at the narrative outset: they do 
not simply exist in the qualia-less twin-worlds of p-zombie argumentation. Because they 
begin as conscious entities, transitional protagonists can articulate changes they undergo as 
they experience them, so long as they remain partially human and conscious. In what 
follows, I am not concerned with casting doubt over physicalism, so for the sake of clarity let 
us take for granted that full-ďloǁŶ zoŵďies’ ŵeŶtal states are different to their living 
counterpaƌts’.viii This is certainly implied by Pretty Dead’s eǀoĐatioŶ of cordyceps, the fungus 
Regina cites as the cause of her metamorphosis. Cordyceps is said to ͞iŶfeĐt͟ its host’s mind, 
͞ǁiŶ[ŶiŶg] ĐoŶtƌol…Đoŵpel[liŶg]͟ the host’s behavior.ix RegiŶa’s eǆpeƌieŶtial aĐĐouŶts 
indicate that her zombified mindset is unlike her conscious experiences. When she kills, she 
proclaims that the fuŶgus ͞ŵust haǀe takeŶ oǀeƌ…I doŶ’t eǀeŶ ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ďitiŶg hiŵ…I ďlaĐk 
out or something.͟ Heƌ defeŶsiǀe asseƌtioŶ ͞[i]t’s Ŷot ŵe, it’s ǁhat’s iŶside ŵe͟ overtly 
distinguishes between her conscious awareness and the zombie-state the fungus instills.  
Despite this clear delimitation of human consciousness and zom-being, the transition 
happens gradually, and the boundary between the two states is fuzzy. Regina does not 
become a full-blown zombie when she first eats human flesh since she exhibits leanings 
towards such behavior beforehand. She rejects fresh foods (claiming they smell ͞ƌotteŶ͟) 
and instead eats raw bacon; she bites Ryan; she sucks the blood from a used tampon. None 
of these transition behaviors is enough to denote that Regina has stopped living and has 
become undead. It is also unclear precisely when heƌ ďodǇ dies. RegiŶa’s faĐe staƌts to ƌot 
and she craves human flesh while she still has a pulse. Her heart has stopped by the time 
she is institutionalized, but she remains lucid. RegiŶa’s physiological change is on-going, so 
there is no definitive break between life and death.  
These gradual slippages mean that even if we agree that full-blown zombies are non-
conscious, it is difficult to measure the difference between human and zombie by referring 
solely to physical modifications, reported mental experiences, or behavioral changes. 
Notably, these three elements are indicative of opposing schools within philosophy of self: 
physicalism/functionalism, phenomenology/consciousness studies, and behaviorism. 
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RegiŶa’s tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ ƌeǀeals that the self cannot be apprehended by just one of these 
divisive theories, because selfhood is a compound of these elements. For instance, 
phenomenal experiences are shaped by physical, sensory faculties (see Schechtman). Ergo, 
without a body, our consciousness would differ in a way that we (as embodied beings) 
cannot imagine. The reverse is also true: one cannot envision what it would be like to be a 
conscious-less body, since such imagination a priori requires sentient, self-reflective 
experience. The p-zombie conceivability debate is founded on that impossibility. However, 
proponents of the p-zombie argument seldom explain eŵďodiŵeŶt’s iŵpaĐt oŶ 
consciousness in this way. Neither do they typically account for the connections between 
selfhood and identity. RegiŶa’s mutation into zom-being is a shift away from humanity, but 
her humanity has meaning as aŶ aspeĐt of RegiŶa’s social identity. 
 
Zom-body to Love: Sociosexuality of the Living Dead  
RegiŶa’s struggle is grounded in concrete social relationships and structures. Contra to Fiona 
MaĐpheƌsoŶ’s assuƌaŶĐe that iŶtƌospeĐtioŶ is eŶough to ǀalidate pheŶoŵeŶal eǆpeƌieŶĐe, 
ďeĐause ͞iŶtƌospeĐtiǀe kŶoǁledge that I haǀe of ŵǇ oǁŶ ĐoŶsĐiousŶess does Ŷot depeŶd foƌ 
its existence on conditions external to me͟ (231-2), in Pretty Dead it is recognized that 
human self-experience is always-already dependent on external factors. Identity does not 
tally with solipsistic asociality. Indeed, practical, social circumstances facilitate the 
iŶdiǀidual’s aďilitǇ to foƌŵ ideŶtitǇ ;see Weƌth, ϯϯϵ; Epƌight, ϴϬϭ; WiŶteƌ, Ϯϯ5Ϳ.  
Entirely asocial selfhood is just as unconceivable as disembodied consciousness, because 
humans are interdependent from birth. The relationalist pƌoposal that ͞the ǁell-being of 
each member [of the populace] is interwoven with the well-ďeiŶg of all otheƌ ŵeŵďeƌs͟ 
(Killmister, 256) may leave little room for independence, but it underlines how significant 
social relations are in forging the self. In addition, many pragmatic social tenets stem from 
essential interconnection, including theories of dignity and moral responsibility (see Ober, 
832). Thus, sociality impacts directly on how we position ourselves in the world, how we 
relate to others, how we assess ourselves, and so forth. This cultural-relational account does 
not supplant physicalism. Indeed, Amy Banks draws on neuroimaging to make an 
essentialist case that humans are interconnected by default. The cultural-relational 
paradigm implies that any one exclusory philosophical model (physicalism, behaviorism, 
functionalism) fails to paint a complete enough picture of selfhood, because these 
theoretical conceptions of selfhood do not do enough to account for how we actually 
experience selfhood in the social realm.  
Although Regina prizes her social bonds, zombies – who routinely kill and devour – do not 
(or at least zombies do not express sociality in the way humans do). As she undergoes her 
transition into zom-being, Regina is torn between two incompatible modes of existence. Her 
auto-biographical accounts are thus conflicted. Even though she does Ŷot ƌeĐall ͞doiŶg aŶǇ 
of the…shit͟ she is aĐĐused of, Regina expresses regret over her actions. For example, she 
adŵits liaďilitǇ foƌ those aĐtioŶs as if she ǁeƌe ĐoŶsĐious of heƌ ďehaǀioƌs; ͞I kŶoǁ I did it…I 
didŶ’t ŵeaŶ to do it.͟ RegiŶa’s ƋuestioŶ ͞what kind of cure is there for the thiŶgs I’ǀe 
done?...I doŶ’t ǁaŶt to ďe a monster,͟ is particularly telling in this light. First, she takes 
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oǁŶeƌship oǀeƌ the killiŶgs Đoŵŵitted ;͞thiŶgs I’ǀe doŶe͟Ϳ. “eĐoŶd, she assesses those aĐts 
according to human values, suggesting that they are incurably monstrous actions. Third, she 
ǁƌites those aĐtioŶs iŶto heƌ ideŶtitǇ, duďďiŶg heƌself ͞a ŵoŶsteƌ.͟ RegiŶa theƌeďǇ aŶĐhoƌs 
her liability for the killings in her selfhood. However, this means that she both judges her 
actions from a human perspective – distancing herself from the perpetƌatoƌ’s ŵoŶstƌositǇ – 
and also recognizes that she is the inhuman creature she vilifies. Her discordant assessment 
is only deepened by her outright denials elsewhere in the film; ͞I sǁeaƌ I didŶ’t do this…that 
ǁasŶ’t ŵe.͟ 
RegiŶa’s conflicting statements reveal not a tug of conscience, but a disjuncture in her 
being. The onset of zom-being impels Regina towards forsaking the values and social bonds 
that define her humanity. Zom-being necessitates anti-social activity
x
 – flesh-eating – and so 
relinquishing social bonds is a necessary part of zom-becoming. RegiŶa’s efforts to resist 
turning into a zombie are expressed as attempts to maintain her established notion of 
human sociality. For example, Regina declares, ͞I doŶ’t ǁaŶt to huƌt people aŶǇŵoƌe…so I 
stay away from them.͟ Although ͞staǇ[iŶg] aǁaǇ͟ ŵeaŶs ŶegatiŶg soĐialitǇ, her intent is 
social in orientation since it recognizes her duty to defend others. 
RegiŶa’s ĐoŶfliĐt is ŵost Ŷotaďle iŶ heƌ keǇ soĐial ƌelatioŶship: her love for Ryan. Regina 
wishes to maintain their affiliation, iŵploƌiŶg ͞I Ŷeed Ǉouƌ help,͟ aŶd aŶgƌilǇ aĐĐusiŶg RǇaŶ 
of ͞ditĐhiŶg [her] ǁheŶ [she] Ŷeeded [hiŵ] ŵost.͟ Simultaneously, by keeping Ryan close, 
Regina poses a threat to his safety. Although Regina longs to maintain her social links in 
order to evince her humanity then, in doing so she risks eradicating those bonds. Moreover, 
RegiŶa’s tƌaŶsitioŶ iŶto zoŵ-being can be charted via her changing relationship with Ryan, 
because Ryan’s presence underscores her loss of humanity-qua-sociality. The earliest point 
iŶ the plot is RegiŶa’s fiƌst date ǁith RǇaŶ, aŶd the ďulk of Pretty Dead maps their 
ƌelatioŶship uŶtil RǇaŶ’s death. RǇaŶ’s ĐhaŶgiŶg attitudes toǁaƌds RegiŶa also illuŵiŶates 
her gradual transformation. Ryan iŶitiallǇ aĐĐepts RegiŶa’s ďehaǀioƌ. He laughs it off when 
Regina bites him ;͞I appƌeĐiate Ǉouƌ eŶthusiasŵ, ďut Jesus Chƌist Ǉou’ǀe got to ǁatĐh those 
Đhoŵpeƌs͟Ϳ, and proclaims that he loves her ͞despite the faĐt that [she is] eating raw 
ďaĐoŶ.͟ Ryan jokingly adapts Kelis’ Milkshake, siŶgiŶg ͞Ǉou like to dƌiŶk huŵaŶ laƌd, I’ŵ 
going to ďloǁ ŵǇ ĐhuŶks͟ as Regina consumes a glass of liquidized fat. Ryan admits that 
such jokes help him ͞Đope.͟ As the film progresses however, RǇaŶ’s gags articulate his 
escalating trepidation. Although light-heaƌted iŶ toŶe, RǇaŶ’s request ͞doŶ’t eat ŵe if I die͟ 
expresses a valid fear. As Regina changes and his doubts intensify, RǇaŶ’s jokes are replaced 
by serious requests – ͞[l]et ŵe take Ǉou to the hospital…it’s Ŷot fuŶŶǇ͟ – and eventually 
outright terror; ͞you asked me to shoot you… I’ŵ sĐaƌed fucking shitless.͟ These shifts 
chronicle the decline of their relationship. 
Ryan provides a constant human presence that throws RegiŶa’s changes into relief. The 
disjuncture between RegiŶa’s self-as-experienced and the social world that situates her 
increases as she transforms. Regina attempts to resolve that tension by embracing death: 
that is, consciously turning her back on her previous life. After a bleach cocktail ;͞kill juiĐe͟Ϳ 
fails to cure her, Regina decides to shoot herself. This suicide attempt is shown twice: once 
at the outset, and again towards the end of the film. This repeated incident bookends 
Regina’s transition into zom-being and the decline of her union with Ryan. The suicide 
attempt fails, only scarring her face. Regina then immediately kills Ryan. Although her 
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ontological status remains unclear in the remainder of the film, killing Ryan is a significant 
ŵaƌkeƌ iŶ RegiŶa’s movement towards the ͞eŶd of heƌ life͟ as a sociosexual being.  
The second most significant turning point in her transformation is pƌeseŶted at the filŵ’s 
conclusion, and again appears to connote the end of RegiŶa’s life. In the final frames before 
the ĐlosiŶg Đƌedits, RegiŶa’s ƌottiŶg ďodǇ is Đaƌƌied aǁaǇ oŶ a guƌŶeǇ. A pulsing double-beat 
redolent of a heartbeat occupies the soundscape, and is eventually replaced by a high-
pitched tone reminiscent of a heart-monitor flat-lining. To think of this as a straight-forward 
phǇsiĐal death is to ŵisƌead RegiŶa’s tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd the seƋueŶĐe’s soĐioseǆual 
significance. The sound does not indicate that Regina ĐoŵpletelǇ ͞tuƌŶs͟ or physiologically 
dies. Nurse Boyle is uŶaďle to fiŶd RegiŶa’s pulse some time before these closing frames, 
and so the final soundscape does not denote asystole. Furthermore, Regina already survived 
flat-lining at a much earlier point in the plot. Before Regina and Ryan are engaged, she 
overdoses on drugs. In a retrospective voice-over, Regina theorizes that when Ryan 
resuscitated her, she was brought ďaĐk as oŶe of the uŶdead; ͞I died that Ŷight, I’ǀe ďeeŶ 
dead ever since.͟ RegiŶa’s stateŵeŶt is defiŶitiǀe, as if there was a single moment in which 
she became a zombie. This distinction is not corroborated by the gradual transition she 
undergoes. More precisely, when Ryan resuscitated Regina, he started her on the path from 
humanity to zom-being. The flat-line tone recurs throughout the film. It is heard regularly 
during Regina’s iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁith Dr. Romera, and also sounds iŶ the ǁake of RǇaŶ’s death.  
The filŵ’s ĐlosiŶg seƋueŶĐe uŶdeƌsĐoƌes that RegiŶa’s ƌelatioŶship ǁith RǇaŶ is inextricable 
from her sociosexual identity. The filŵ’s final flat-line tone is another phase in her on-going 
transition rather than a distinct physiological tipping-point. Indeed, visual cues suggest that 
the flat-line is metaphysical rather than literal. CCTV shots of RegiŶa’s deĐoŵposiŶg ďodǇ 
being carried from a padded cell are intercut with flashes of Regina and Ryan together 
before the onset of her transformation. The insert shots are edited to the souŶdsĐape’s 
pulsing heartbeat. Intercutting between RegiŶa’s lost ƌelatioŶship aŶd iŵages of heƌ putƌid 
body (the state in which she Đaused RǇaŶ’s deathͿ suggests that RegiŶa’s metaphorical heart 
– her capacity for love – dies in these climactic moments. Her memories of Ryan pulse like a 
heartbeat, indicating that RegiŶa’s brain functionality (her consciousness) ceases 
simultaneously. The flat-liŶe toŶe iŶdiĐates the death of RegiŶa’s huŵaŶitǇ-qua-sociality. 
The cessation of RegiŶa’s sociosexuality puŶĐtuates the filŵ’s closure.  
CuŵulatiǀelǇ, RegiŶa’s overdose, suicide attempts, and gradual putrefaction are inseparable 
from the metaphoric demise of her sociosexuality, her consciousness, and thus her 
humanity. Hoǁeǀeƌ, RegiŶa’s suďsequent state is not fully realized in the film. Her 
continuing transition into zom-being does not evoke death as an ending. After all, even full-
blown zombies continue to exist. The narrative shape corroborates this theme. The film 
features two post-credit sequences, further underlining that ostensible endings are instead 
points of continuation. Pretty Dead also opeŶs ǁith RegiŶa’s appaƌeŶt suiĐide ǁhiĐh aͿ only 
appears to be an ending, and b) happens more than once: it is repeated later in the film. It is 
ďeǇoŶd the filŵ’s ĐapaĐitǇ to fiŶallǇ eluĐidate RegiŶa’s eǆpeƌieŶĐe of full-blown zom-being. 
Instead, Pretty Dead de-Ŷatuƌalizes RegiŶa’s assuŵptioŶs aďout the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ 
humanity-qua-ƌatioŶalitǇ aŶd ͞iƌƌatioŶal͟ zoŵ-being. Despite her desire to control (hinder) 
her transformation, Regina cannot impede the inexorable change. RegiŶa’s ďehaǀioƌ is thus 
at odds with her ability to control or rationalize her conduct, leaving Regina torn between 
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two states of being. Pretty Dead thereby flags that rationalizing discourses are unable to 
capture or wholly explain self-experience. 
 
Zom-Beauty/Zom-Beast: Rationality and the Experiential Hierarchy 
Rationality is premised on the idea that humans ought to be able control their behaviors 
and desires. In this view, the capacity for rationality separates humans from animals, and 
animal consciousness is implied to be deficient in comparison to human consciousness. An 
archetypal version of this argument is John Stuart Mill’s ǀaloƌization of human satisfactions 
(14). Although he has no insight into what it is to be like a pig, Mill presumes that because a 
pig lacks the human capacity for understanding, a pig’s eǆpeƌieŶĐes of the ǁoƌld aƌe iŶfeƌioƌ 
to a huŵaŶ’s. Mill’s partiality towards human consciousness is commonplace. Indeed, it is 
replicated in and legitimated by the authoritative structures of medical science, psychology, 
law, economics, and so forth. These vast institutions contribute to the existential grand 
narrative that human consciousness is the standard against which all other experiential 
viewpoints are tested and found wanting. Experiences of selfhood that contradict that 
overwhelming grand narrative are consistently invalidated. Indeed, the specter of mental 
illness underlines that there are ͞incorrect͟ ways of experiencing the world. Those who fail 
to adheƌe to estaďlished ͞ĐoƌƌeĐt͟ ǀisioŶs of reality and self-experience are routinely 
institutionalized, for example. Life-foƌŵs that ͞laĐk͟ ͞full͟ huŵaŶ ĐoŶsĐiousŶess – sentience 
and/or the capacity for rational reflection – are typically treated with disdain (or even 
destroyed).  
OŶ Mill’s sĐale, the zoŵďie ǁould ďe a loǁeƌ-life form because the undead lack 
consciousness. It is clear why zombies are ostensibly incomplete beings: from the living 
huŵaŶ’s peƌspeĐtiǀe, death is the ultimate loss, and so zombies embody deprivation. Yet, 
undeath does not strictly equate to lifelessness, since zombies continue to exist and remain 
animate. The zoŵďie’s state is iŶĐoŵpaƌaďle to the huŵaŶ’s. As the p-zombie argument 
elucidates, it is inadequate to think of zombies as sub-humans. Zombies do not have 
phenomenological consciousness, and therefore occupy the world in a way that is 
unintelligible to the living because human psychology is rooted in experiential awareness. 
Although zom-being is a fictional state, as a thought-experiment zombies flag how 
iŶadeƋuate Mill’s hierarchical stance is. The world may be experienced in numerous ways. 
Since we have no access to alternative modes of experience, the argument that human 
seŶtieŶĐe supplies the ͞ďest͟ eǆpeƌieŶĐes is gƌouŶdless.  
Transitional zombie narratives highlight this inadequacy. Regina offers no direct access to 
what being a zombie is finally like, since full-blown zombies (following the p-zombie 
paradigm) can no longer verbalize or reflect on their state, since they have no qualia to refer 
to. However, this does not mean her slippage into zom-being is an experiential ͞deĐliŶe.͟ To 
Regina-qua-human, her relationship with Ryan deteriorates. However, it does not follow 
that RegiŶa’s tƌaŶsitioŶ iŶto zoŵ-being is itself degenerative. To Regina-qua-zombie, the 
ƌelatioŶship is ŵeaŶiŶgless; soĐialitǇ is Ŷot ƌeleǀaŶt to the zoŵďie’s state. Human inability to 
conceive of what zom-being would be like denotes that our conceptual capacity is 
insufficient for understanding otheƌ eŶtities’ states, and even the world itself. Regina flags 
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that inadequacy. Regina’s autobiographical statements are themed around her social bonds, 
her identity, her capacity for consciousness, and her physicality. These reflections underline 
how she conceives of herself, what she values about her existence, and what (as a human) 
Regina fears she will lose as a result of her metamorphosis.  
Her anxieties stem from the degree of control she has over those changes, and her in/ability 
to comprehend those changes via an anthropocentric understanding of self-experience. 
Regina reacts by gripping onto the kind of rationalist view Mill venerates. Yet the 
scientifically credible actions Regina implements to hinder the process only expedite her 
transformation; ͞[e]ǀeƌǇthiŶg I do to fiǆ ŵǇself,͟ RegiŶa oďseƌǀes, ͞just ŵakes thiŶgs 
ǁoƌse.͟ EǀeŶtuallǇ, RegiŶa’s quest to retain control spirals towards irrationality. For 
example, she announces that she ǁishes she Đould tuƌŶ heƌ ͞ďodǇ iŶside out aŶd sĐƌuď [the 
fuŶgus] off.͟ RegiŶa’s gƌotesƋue yearning emphasizes her internal, experiential viewpoint at 
the point when her rational actions and language fail her.  
The sovereignty of rational consciousness is bolstered by institutional structures, and Pretty 
Dead undercuts that ostensibly integral position. The second viewpoint offered oŶ RegiŶa’s 
transition is external: having been institutionalized for murdering Ryan and a pizza delivery 
driver, Regina is observed by Dr. Romera. Here too she reflects upon her experiences, but 
her report is contested ďǇ Roŵeƌa’s diagŶoses. Romera is the mouthpiece for a version of 
rationalist thought that carries disquieting connotations. Pretty Dead’s poƌtƌaǇal of a 
woman a) whose rationality is called into question, b) whose carnality is deemed monstrous, 
and c) whose liberty is infringed upon by medico-legal apparatuses, is reminiscent of 
͞hǇsteƌia:͟ diagnostic rhetoric that carries deeply misogynistic overtones. As Julie Lokis-
Adkins observes, ͞by the end of the [19th Century], half of all women were thought to be 
hysterics͟ because they resisted the societal limitations imposed on them; ͞there were two 
options for young, unmarried women: enter a convent or marry͟ (40; see also Greer, 55). 
That is, gender-biased socio-sexual norms were implemented via two types of institution – 
medical and matrimonial – legitimating the broad fear that any woman who did not adhere 
to theiƌ ͞pƌopeƌ͟ soĐial plaĐe ǁould ͞ďeĐoŵe a seǆual pƌedatoƌ: a ŵoŶsteƌ eǀeŶ͟ ;Lokis-
Adkins, 40; see also Mesch, 107). Ironically, such terror itself smacks of hysteria. This over-
wrought reaction implies that female sexuality is enormously potent, even capable of 
disturbing the entire patriarchal structure. Neither historically rooted gendered oppression 
nor contemporary gender politics will be dwelt upon in what follows.
xi
 Of greater pertinence 
to the discussion in hand are the ways in which a particular view of existence is validated. 
The legal-medical structure not only confirms but also enforces a vision of reality that stems 
from scientific rationality. In Pretty Dead, that ethos is embodied by Romera, who seeks to 
͞Đuƌe͟ RegiŶa aŶd ƌetuƌŶ heƌ to ͞Ŷoƌŵal.͟ That is, Romera imposes his established 
rationalist view, ignoring Regina’s objections to his diagnosis. Romera talks over RegiŶa’s 
protests rather than considering her purported self-experiences, thereby indicating his 
belief that his explication is incontestable.  
Although Regina’s aŶd Roŵeƌa’s diagŶoses Đlash, it is Ŷot that their appraisals of RegiŶa’s 
situation are entirely dichotomous. RegiŶa’s auto-diagŶosis shaƌes Roŵeƌa’s judgŵeŶt that 
zom-ďeiŶg is uŶaĐĐeptaďle. Befoƌe RegiŶa is aƌƌested, she pƌoĐlaiŵs ͞oďǀiouslǇ I’ŵ out of 
ĐoŶtƌol. I’ŵ a ŵoŶsteƌ.͟ Heƌ assessŵeŶt is diƌeĐtlǇ eĐhoed iŶ Roŵeƌa’s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ that Regina 
͞is out of ĐoŶtƌol.͟ RegiŶa’s self-evaluation denotes her devotion to a rational 
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anthropocentric view of existence despite its incongruity with her self-experience. Although 
Regina apprehends her position via scientific models ;͞I’ŵ Ŷot sĐhizophƌeŶiĐ…[oƌ] 
delusioŶal͟Ϳ, she documents her experiences during her transition by referring to how she 
feels (͞I ĐaŶ feel it iŶ ŵe,͟ ͞I feel pƌettǇ dead alƌeadǇ͟). Pretty Dead thereby validates her 
sensations as a mode of understanding her transition rather than rejecting those 
expressions of self-experience (as Romera does).  
The same balance is achieved via Pretty Dead’s foƌŵ. Pretty Dead is characterized as a ͞tƌue 
story;͟ on-screen captions posit that the film is ͞a Đollection of…ƌeĐoǀeƌed͟ footage.xii Yet 
Pretty Dead’s ǀieǁeƌ is not encouraged to side with Roŵeƌa’s rational, external view and 
reject RegiŶa’s internal-experiential claim that she is undead. Roŵeƌa’s aŶd RegiŶa’s 
clashing diagnoses are reflected in Pretty Dead’s dual formal perspectives. In the asylum, 
Regina is perceived via a sterile observatory stance. These sequences are shot via three 
cameras that are aligned with Romera’s peƌspeĐtiǀe, theƌeďǇ iŵplǇiŶg that his diagŶosis is 
accurate. The first camera is situated alongside Romera, and films Regina front-on. No 
reverse angle is available (no camera captures Romera front-on). Regina is clearly inspected 
in a way that Romera is not, implying that her version of events requires justification, 
whereas his is unquestioned. The second is a CCTV camera situated behind Romera. 
Although much of the room is covered in these shots, the camera faces only Regina: Romera 
remains anonymous. Additionally, this camera captures other figures (orderlies and nurses) 
who concur with Roŵeƌa’s diagnosis. Their presence corroborates that his clinical opinion is 
a majority stance. The third camera is less definitive. Placed side on to Romera and Regina, 
this camera frames their conversation in a more balanced fashion: Regina on screen-right, 
Romera on screen-left. Romera is scrutinized on the same level as Regina in these shots. 
This third camera is more broadly indicative of Pretty Dead’s ŵethodologǇ. Approximately 
60 per cent of the movie is Đaptuƌed ďǇ RegiŶa aŶd RǇaŶ’s ĐaŵĐoƌdeƌ. In much of that 
footage, Regina expounds her experiences. Even where the content is highly personal in 
Ŷatuƌe, depiĐtiŶg RegiŶa aŶd RǇaŶ’s ƌelatioŶship foƌ eǆaŵple, the found-footage mode 
paints these iŶĐideŶts as eŵpiƌiĐal faĐt, eƋual to Roŵeƌa’s observations. Indeed, the 
camcorder tape’s status as evidence is verified firstly by an on-screen caption stating that 
the video is ͞all that ƌeŵaiŶs to tell [RegiŶa’s] stoƌǇ,͟ aŶd seĐoŶdlǇ ďǇ Roŵeƌa’s declaration 
that the camcorder footage would authenticate RegiŶa’s self-diagnosis.  
Since Pretty Dead iŶĐludes RegiŶa’s auto-documentation, her seemingly irrational diagnosis 
is legitimated for the viewer. In contrast, Romera fails to cure Regina, despite his plausible 
explanation for her condition. Scientific rationality is incapable of capturing what is 
happening to Regina. For instance, although Roŵeƌa states that ͞it ǁould ďe easǇ to pƌoǀe 
what you say is true if we do a phǇsiĐal,͟ even the most rudimentary medical methods fail. 
Nurse Boyle deems that her equipment is ͞broken͟ when she cannot fiŶd RegiŶa’s ďlood 
pressure. The sedatives Romera prescribes are ineffective. Regina’s oǁŶ ƌeliaŶĐe oŶ 
scientific rationalization is just as flawed. Although she perceives her transition as a ͞big 
medical breakthrough,͟ her documentation quickly spirals into an autobiographical mode, 
focusing on her crumbling sociosexual relationship. There are no discoveries, just personal 
effects. Her self-shot video is not available to evince her case to Romera. Instead, the tapes 
serve an intimate social function: they are aŶ eǆteŶded suiĐide Ŷote to RegiŶa’s 
companions. In RegiŶa’s fiŶal ŵoŵeŶts of auto-documentation, she apologizes to her loved 
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ones (͞soƌƌǇ Dad, this isŶ’t Ǉouƌ fault͟Ϳ and expresses her self-destructive iŶteŶtioŶs ;͞I’ŵ 
alƌeadǇ dead alƌeadǇ [siĐ], I just Ŷeed a little help lǇiŶg doǁŶ͟). 
Despite their powerful supporting structures, rationalist medico-scientific understandings of 
RegiŶa’s ĐoŶditioŶ are ultimately subordinate to her personal experiences and social 
identity in Pretty Dead. So, contrary to the commonplace notion that rationality is a pre-
condition for forming meaningful social bonds (Anderson, 2013: 127-8), Pretty Dead 
indicates that a) phenomenological experience is the foundation of selfhood, and b) social 
bonds provide an index for the formation of identity. These are the elements Regina loses 
during her transition into zom-being. Rationality provides one mode of apprehending self, 
but here it pales in comparison with experiential understanding of selfhood in the socio-
sexual realm.  
 
Zom-bequeathed: Sociosexual P-Zombies 
Although Pretty Dead does not answer the question of what it is like to be a zombie, 
RegiŶa’s tƌaŶsitioŶ highlights crucial differences between human experience and zom-being. 
Most notably, Pretty Dead probes the role sociality – here, epitomized as sociosexuality – 
plays in self-conception. The narrative thereby also undercuts the anthropocentric 
͞eǆpeƌieŶtial hieƌaƌĐhǇ͟ on which rationalist notions of human consciousness are founded. 
Thus, transitional zombie narratives such as Pretty Dead highlight areas in selfhood 
philosophy that would benefit from greater critical attention. First, intuitive self-experience 
should not be neglected. Self-reports are typically viewed as problematic because they are 
prone to bias and error (see Doucet; Hohwy; Whiting). However, dismissing 
autobiographical accounts entirely risks privileging rationalism and misses what is useful 
about such accounts: that they reflect how selfhood is experienced in the social realm. 
Second, we should not be blind to the impact institutional arrangements of power have 
both on self-experience and on conceptions of selfhood. In Pretty Dead, these structures are 
embodied by the rationalist medico-legal institution in which Regina is detained. The conflict 
ďetǁeeŶ RegiŶa aŶd Roŵeƌa’s ǀieǁpoiŶts eǀiŶĐes the Ŷeed foƌ a new discourse that is 
attuned to RegiŶa’s self-experiences rather than one that quashes incompatible reports.  
To neglect the social world – in which experiences happen, in which behaviors manifest, in 
which identity of formed – is to hark back to a Cartesian model of selfhood, which separates 
interior and exterior. As AŶdƌea NǇe oďseƌǀes, ReŶe DesĐaƌtes’ dualistic paradigm is flawed 
because he envisages consciousness as ͞solipsistiĐ…ƌemoved from passion and 
imagination,͟ aŶd ultiŵatelǇ dƌiǀes a wedge ͞between feeling and knowing͟ (26). Although 
dualism is largely rejected in contemporary philosophy, we should take care not to replicate 
his conceptual flaw: privileging self-experience to the extent that ͞self͟ is diǀoƌĐed fƌoŵ 
social reality. A coherent theory of selfhood must bridge between the personal, internal 
world of desires, motives, and intentions on one hand and the external social world on the 
other. Many proponents of the p-zombie debates fail to achieve this balance because they 
focus on rationalizing paradigms such as ͞phǇsiĐalisŵ,͟ and are not attuned to our 
experiences of self. 
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It is surprising that interdependent sociality has featured so little in discussions regarding 
zombies and consciousness to date. Sociality is fundamental to self-conception, and so it 
impacts on self-experience. Transitional zombie narratives offer an avenue into examining 
consciousness that is sensitive to an intuitive version of selfhood, one that develops the p-
zombie debates by thinking about selfhood in a pragmatic way. In contrast, p-zombie 
debates are typically hypothetical in nature, and lead to some outlandish assertions about 
self-experience. For instance, Philip Goff proposes that he cannot imagine what it is to be a 
zoŵďie, ďut ĐaŶ ƌeadilǇ ĐoŶĐeiǀe of ďeiŶg aŶ eƋuallǇ hǇpothetiĐal ͞loŶelǇ ghost.͟ It is little 
wonder that some philosophers have rejected p-zombies altogether. Daniel Dennett, for 
example, has labeled the p-zoŵďie aƌguŵeŶt ͞pƌeposteƌous,͟ elaďoƌatiŶg that it is a 
͞stƌaŶgelǇ attƌaĐtiǀe͟ ďut ͞uŶsuppoƌtaďle hǇpothesis͟ that ought to ďe ͞dƌopped … like a 
hot potato͟ (171). 
Those zombies we can apprehend – those represented in popular culture – are of 
philosophical value in ways that their p-zombie brethren are not. Contemporary movie 
zombies are becoming ever more akin to humans, and commonly occupy human social 
situations. Rather than being denizens of apocalyptic wastelands, the undead are now 
fƌeƋueŶtlǇ plaĐed iŶ uŶeǆĐeptioŶal ͞huŵaŶ͟ sĐeŶarios, as titles such as Zombie 
Cheerleading Camp (2007), Zombie Beach Party (2003) and Brunch of the Living Dead (2006) 
evince. As they come to inhabit a broader range of everyday social spheres and become 
increasingly alive to human experiences, movie zombies are becoming progressively 
valuable conduits for philosophical reflection on the self and ourselves. 
As I have argued throughout this chapter, Pretty Dead is a prototypical example of how 
zombie movies can be utilized for philosophical enquiry into sociosexual existence. Pretty 
Dead is rooted in reality, both formally (employing found-footage realism), and thematically 
(foĐusiŶg oŶ RegiŶa’s ŵediĐo-legal and social conditions). Crucially, Pretty Dead underlines 
Regina’s experience of transition, and this is what viewers engage with. Rationally, we know 
RegiŶa’s stoƌǇ is fiĐtioŶal, that RegiŶa is peƌfoƌŵed ďǇ aŶ actor (Carly Oates), and that 
zombies do not genuinely exist. Viewers who engage with Pretty Dead as a narrative do so 
at an intuitive, experiential level. Compared with the cold, dead analysis of p-zombie 
argumentation, zombie movies are animate and vital. IŶteƌaĐtioŶ ǁith RegiŶa’s stoƌǇ is 
closer to a social, emotive experience than it is an intellectual process. That experience is 
not adequately captured by the rationalist conceptual tools currently at our disposal. Films 
such as Pretty Dead do not just engage its viewers in an intuitive kind of philosophical 
thinking. By depicting a form of selfhood that defies rationalist logic (zom-being), these films 
also challenge their viewers into developing new conceptual (theoretical and imaginative) 
vocabularies via which to describe and engage with both selfhood and sociosexuality.  
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i
 The philosophical zombie was evoked earlier by Kripke and Block for example, although 
Chalŵeƌs’ ĐoŶteŶtioŶs haǀe iŶspiƌed ŵuĐh ƌeĐeŶt deďate. 
ii
 A teƌŵiŶologiĐal poiŶt ƌeƋuiƌes ĐlaƌifiĐatioŶ. The teƌŵ ͞tƌaŶsitioŶ͟ Đaƌƌies estaďlished 
meanings in the context of sociosexual identity discourse. Individuals experience sociosexual 
tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶs of all kiŶds, ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ puďesĐeŶĐe to ͞ĐoŵiŶg out͟ to tƌaŶsseǆual 
tƌaŶsitioŶ. MǇ use of ͞tƌaŶsitioŶ͟ does Ŷot seek to dƌaǁ a ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ ďetǁeeŶ aŶǇ of these 
particular shifts and becoming undead.            
iii
 This plaǇ oŶ ͞Roŵeƌo͟ eǀiŶĐes that the Ŷaƌƌatiǀe is ĐleaƌlǇ staked as a zoŵďie filŵ, despite 
the aŵďiguitǇ oǀeƌ RegiŶa’s uŶdeadŶess. 
iv
 There are two notable variations on this theme. First, films such as Zombie Love (2007) and 
A Zombie Love Song (2013) depict zombies falling in love with living persons. Zombies are 
limned as having autonomy in these cases, and so they will not be considered here. Second, 
Dating a Zombie (2012) presents a living protagonist who eschews relationships with the 
living in favour of paƌtŶeƌships ǁith the uŶdead. IŶ this Đase, soĐialitǇ’s ǀalue is Đalled iŶto 
question. Anyone interested in the practicalities of sociosexuality in the wake of outbreak 
may wish to consult Chip and Bernie's Dating Guide for the Zombie Apocalypse (2011), which 
outlines problems assoĐiated ǁith ͞zoŵaŶĐe͟ aŶd offeƌs adǀiĐe oŶ haŶdliŶg the ͞opposite͟ 
(undead) sex.  
v
 Indeed, zombies exhibit behaviours, but (presumably) have no underlying mental states. 
vi
 Qualia, in this view, are indicators of consciousness. 
vii
 On the conceivability of p-zombies and epistemic limitations, see Hanrahan; Goff; Diaz-
Leon; Majeed. 
viii
 As an aside, some full-blown zombies claim to have experiences and display awareness of 
their state. One prototypical example is the female zombie torso in Return of the Living 
Dead ;ϭϵϴ5Ϳ ǁho is aďle to aƌtiĐulate that ďeiŶg uŶdead ͞huƌts;͟ she eǆplaiŶs that zoŵďies 
eat brains because it temporarily assuages the agony of being dead. This zombie purports to 
have at least one kind of phenomenal experience (pain), which signifies self-knowledge: the 
zombie describes herself as an entity that has undergone an experience. One could argue 
that the zombie is mistaken and does not really have phenomenal experiences. There is a 
difference between stating that one has had an experience and actually having an 
experience. However, the same line of thought would give us reason to doubt the veracity 
of Ƌualia iŶ geŶeƌal. We haǀe Ŷo ŵeaŶs of kŶoǁiŶg ǁhetheƌ otheƌ liǀiŶg huŵaŶs’ ƌepoƌts of 
experiencing are as false as the zoŵďies’ aƌe. Moƌeoǀeƌ, if the zoŵďie ďelieǀes that theǇ aƌe 
eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg, theƌe is eǀeƌǇ ĐhaŶĐe that oŶe’s oǁŶ Đlaiŵs to eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg aƌe also false. 
IŶĐƌedulitǇ oǀeƌ the zoŵďies’ Đlaiŵ to ĐoŶsĐiousŶess leaǀes the liǀiŶg sĐeptiĐ ǁith Ŷo 
grounds for demonstrating their own claim to consciousness (on this quandary, see 
Macpherson, 231-2). 
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ix
 Cordyceps fungus also causes the zombie plague in the recent videogame The Last of Us 
(2013). 
x
 Flesh eating is anti-soĐial aĐĐoƌdiŶg to RegiŶa’s Ŷoƌŵs. IŶ soŵe cultures cannibalism is a 
social practice rooted in compassion and interpersonal obligation. For example, see Conklin.  
xi
 For discussion of zombies and gender politics, see Jones. 
xii
 Moreover, the film-makers have declared that they intended to make a realistic, 
͞sĐieŶtifiĐallǇ plausiďle͟ zoŵďie filŵ. “ee BeŶ WilkiŶs’ ͞DiƌeĐtoƌ’s “tateŵeŶt,͟ 
http://www.prettydead.com/about-2/cast-crew/directors-statement/ [accessed 
04/07/2013]. 
